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ABSTRACT 
The law relating to domestic violence is largely concentrated on protecting the victim. 
However victims of domestic violence also have important property needs. This paper 
is an analysis of those needs and the laws which deal with domestic violence and 
matrimonial property. Its purpose is to determine whether the law effectively meets 
the immediate, short term and long term needs of those victims 
The Domestic Violence Act and the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 both have the 
potential to meet the immediate and short term needs through occupation and tenancy 
orders, if the tests are applied with a full understanding of the nature if the an 
abusive relationship. The Law However fails to meet the long term property needs of 
victims. It lacks in the flexibility to enable to the victim to obtain an unequal share of 
domestic matrimonial property, and fails to recognise the affect of abuse on 
contributions and the need that such abuse creates. This paper argues that to meet 
these long term needs, the law needs to be flexible and able to consider the need 
created by the abuse, without judging the actions that caused that need 
Word Length 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 14,505 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Domestic violence has become an endemic problem in New Zealand society. 
One way or another we all may be affected, whether as members of the 
community who bears the cost, or as victims. 
The law dealing with domestic violence has improved dramatically in recent 
years with the changes in public attitude, the increased response of the police to 
domestic situations and most importantly, the introduction of the Domestic 
Violence Act 1995 . 
The ability of the law to effectively protect victims of domestic violence has 
been increased by the widened scope of the Act. The court can now grant 
comprehensive orders to protect the victim from violence and molestation. 
Domestic violence has mental, physical and emotional cost for the victim, in the 
long and short term. These have been acknowledged and addressed by the 
Domestic Violence Act; However domestic violence also creates property needs 
for its victims, which have not been so well addressed by the law. 
The purpose of this paper is to understand what those needs are and to look at 
the availability and effectiveness of the options for meeting those needs. In part 
II of my paper I have attempted to outline the main issues surrounding domestic 
violence, to enable the reader to fully understand the affect which it has upon its 
victims. In part III I outline the property needs that arise from an abusive 
relationship. The need for protection cannot be separated from the need for safe 
accommodation. The law needs to address both these needs or it will not be 
effective in meeting either one. In part IV I analyse the immediate need for safe 
accommodation. The law grants the court the ability to make ex parte orders, 
( orders without notice to the other party) granting the victim occupation of 
property. Part IV examines the way in which the court applies the tests for these 
orders and the problems associated with those tests and their temporary nature. 
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Occupation and tenancy orders can be made under both the Domestic Violence 
Act and the Matrimonial Property Act, and potentially provide a longer term 
solution to property needs. I look at the criteria for these orders and their 
respective merits and faults in part V, identifying that the law is alternately too 
strict in it's application, or allows too much discretion, which has the potential 
to cause injustice if not used in conjunction with a full understanding of 
domestic violence. 
In my paper I argue that although the law has the potential to meet the 
immediate and short term needs if utilised properly, the provisions available for 
dealing with long term needs are inadequate. Part VI highlights the avenues 
available under the Matrimonial Property Act for providing for the property 
needs of victims. Victims of abuse do not fit comfortably into any exception to 
the presumption of equal sharing, neither is it appropriate for then to participate 
in mediation, for reasons which I outline in section VI. I conclude my paper by 
addressing some possible solutions to this problem. 
Domestic Violence is an all reaching problem and I acknowledge that its range 
of victims is far reaching. People of all ages, ethnicity and gender are affected. 
However statistics show that victims are predominantly women and so it is on 
this assumption that I have based my paper. I have also limited the scope of my 
paper to addressing the issues for married couples. However, the Domestic 
Violence Act, is not limited to married couples, therefore the implications of the 
Domestic Violence Act extend to de facto couples. 
II THE NATURE OF DOMESTIC ABUSE 
It is necessary to understand the nature and effect of domestic abuse before you 
are able to fully identify and understand the needs of victims of domestic abuse. 
Domestic abuse is not limited to specific acts of abuse, but has a ongoing effect 
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on the way that the parties to the marriage relate to each other, and the different 
needs of those parties. Furthermore, it is necessary to analyse the effect that 
property laws have in meeting those needs. 
Domestic abuse has been hidden within the private realm of society for many 
years, but as the doors are being opened on this disease which plagues society, a 
greater understanding of the causes and the nature of the abuse has enabled 
society and the law to better understand the best ways in which it can respond 
to and deal with the problem. 
A Defining the Term 
Domestic abuse is a very subjective term. What is considered to fall within its 
definition will be determined by the extent of the understanding of the nature of 
domestic abuse. A narrow definition will serve to limit the application of any 
assistance and recognition that the law provides. 
In this paper domestic abuse means the same as defined in section 3(2) of the 
Domestic Violence Act 1995 (DV A) 
(2)1n this section "violence" means -
(a) Physical abuse: 
(b) Sexual abuse: 
( c) Psychological Abuse, including, but not limited to, 
(i) Intimidation: 
(ii) Harassment: 
(iii) Damage to Property: 
(iv) Threats of physical abuse, sexual abuse, or psychological abuse. 
Understanding the context in which abuse occurs is crucial to defining the 
problem. It covers a wide range of behaviours which may hurt the abused 
person physically, emotionally and spiritually. Abuse can come in many different 
4 
patterns, from occasional explosions of brutality to continuous, degrading put-
downs.1 
There is no one physical act, no single type of batterer, or no 
characteristic of a victim which can fully define domestic violence. 
Consequently, domestic violence is best defined as that combination of 
factors and behaviours by which a batterer forces an intimate partner to 
"live with a constant sense of danger and expectation of violence." 2 
B Understanding the Concept 
It has long been a misconception that domestic abuse is about physical violence 
caused by a loss of self-control. The causes of domestic abuse have recently 
been the subject of investigation in an effort to understand and deal with the 
prevalence of domestic abuse in New Zealand. These studies have shown that 
the public generally still considers domestic abuse to be about anger and loss of 
control. There is an underlying reason for the violence, and it is the need of the 
abuser to have power and control. As a result it has been identified that abuse is 
not just about acts of violence, but is about the relationship as a whole and the 
way that the abuser relates to his partner. 
The Power and Control Wheel is one of the simplest methods of understanding 
the extent and nature of domestic abuse. (refer figure 1) 3 
This model describes the tactics most commonly used by men against women in 
a relationship. Each component can be considered separately, however the 
reality is that these tactics are used in combination, an abuser will use any 
combination necessary to get the required control. 
1 J Leibrich, J Paulin and R Ransom. Hitting Home: Al/en Speak About Abuse of Women 
Partners. (Department of Justice 1995) 28. 
2 R Valente; "Addressing Domestic Violence: The Role of the Family Law Practitioner." 
(1995) 29 Number 2 FLQ 187, 188. 
3 G Barnes, S Flenuning, J Johnston and S Toone Domestic Violence (New Zealand Law 
Society Seminar 1993) 5. I have also included tl1e Equality Wheel (figure 2) as a comparison 
of tl1e elements of a healtl1y, non-abusive relationship. 
FIGURE 1 
FIGURE 2 
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NON-THREATENING 
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The outer ring of physical and sexual violence are actions of last resort. They 
are back up tactics, rarely used unless the others prove ineffective. Most 
abusers will not have to use these more obvious tactics as they have achieved 
the control that they seek by other less detectable tactics. 
Where violence is used, it is generally to establish a pattern of submission which 
is then learnt by the victim. The victim learns to read the pattern of their 
partner's abuse and anticipate the need for submission. 
In this way domestic abuse is kept hidden from the public eye. The few 
instances of visible violence are covered up as accidents, or by a clever abuser 
who knows where to hit so that it will not leave a mark. The control and 
manipulation is worked out by the subtle signs that only the partner, sensitised 
to the pattern of the abuser, sees or understands: 4 
Especially when violence has occurred, sometimes only once, these small cues 
are sufficient to send a very powerful message. Many men are seldom violent, 
but are able to use that rare time as an overwhelming reinforcer. Therefore a 
raised eyebrow, a quick rub of the left ear, can remind someone to behave 
themselves or else. 
1 Understanding the tactics. 
Each abusive relationship will involve a uruque combination of any of these 
tactics. The use of these underlying and undetectable tactics affects the way the 
law serves victims of domestic abuse. 
(a) Male privilege 
This segment represents the implied perrruss1on that men have to assume 
control, built into this is the social conditioning which dictates that women have 
to accept the mans control. 5 
4 Above n 3, 3. 
5 Above n 3. 
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(b) Economic abuse 
Abusive men use their control over the money to keep their partner financially 
dependant upon them. As a result, their partner is unable or unwilling to leave 
the only financial security that she knows of for her children. For a large number 
of women the financial cost of leaving is considered to be too high. 6 
c) Coercion and threats 
Threats generally relate to what will happen if the victim leaves the abuser, or 
does not do as he wants. This means that it is simpler and often safer for the 
woman to stay in the relationship with a danger she knows and can predict, 
rather than face the uncertain ramifications of leaving. 7 
(d) Intimidation. 
This is often the most subtle of the tactics. The abuser will clean a weapon in 
front of his partner or will use height or size to make his partner feel 
defenceless. It may even extend to breaking things which are precious to his 
partner. All these tactics serve to remind the victim who is in charge, and to 
keep the victim in a defensive mode. 8 
(e) Emotional abuse 
This is a very common form of abuse, and is generally related to the victim's 
sexuality. To attack the sexuality of the victim is to attack their "very essence of 
being" . 9 The abuser does this to enable himself to dehumanise his partner 
thereby treating her as an object rather than a person. It serves to destroy the 
self-esteem of the victim. After continual, systematic, emotional abuse, the 
victim will loses all confidence in her abilities, and will begin to believe what 
they abuser says about her. 10 
6 Above n 3. 
7 Above n 3. 
8 Above n 3. 
9 Above n 3, 6. 
10 Above n 3. 
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The most harmful aspect of emotional abuse in a domestic setting is that 
intimate partners know which areas are the most sensitive and vulnerable areas 
to attack. As a result, the scars created by emotional abuse are often the 
deepest, and the longest lasting. 11 
(I) Isolation 
Isolation is designed to keep the victim away from any support mechanisms that 
she may have, and to place the focus on the needs and desires of her partner. 
The isolation from social contact also increases the victim's dependence on the 
abuser, and leaves her less able to leave her partner and face the difficulties of 
that situation without support. 12 
(g) Minimising, denying and blaming 
Few abusers look honestly at the affects of their abuse and their responsibility 
for it. They place the responsibility and the need to change on others. The 
abuser will minimise the extent or the seriousness of his actions to avoid any 
guilt, and will cause the victim to feel that their own feelings are not valid. 13 
(h) Using Children 
Abusers use the welfare of the children as a tool to ensure that their partner 
stays with them, they will often challenge for custody, even if they do not want 
to look after the children, in order to maintain control over their partner. Joint 
custody, access and visitation rights enable the abuser to continue his 
harassment of his partner well after the relationship is over. 14 
The control that the abuser exerts over his partner has many facets, and the law 
must be careful to consider the underlying cause of domestic abuse and the 
ways in which it is worked out when dealing with issues relating to that 
relationship. It is not enough to simply protect a victim from physical abuse if 
11 Above n 3. 
12 Above n 3. 
13 Above n 3. 
14 Above n 3. 
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the law does not also address the whole realm of abuse which the victim has 
suffered, and attempt to protect the victim from a continuation of the abuser's 
desire for control, or it will only have dealt with part of the problem. 
2 The victims perspective 
A recent study into the attitudes of men to domestic abuse 15 shows that there is 
a prevalent attitude that women are at least partly to blame for the abuse that 
they suffer. This view is representative of the attitudes of society in general. As 
a consequence, victims of abuse often feel that they are not going to be 
believed, that the behaviour of their abuser is not being condemned. They feel 
that the law, which in their eyes is represented by the white middle class 
judiciary, is not going to assist them in meeting their needs. This belief, although 
it may not be true, has been supported in the past by the actions of the courts. 
This perceived attitude is epitomised by one Australian judge, who on receiving 
an application for a protection order against a husband who threatened his wife 
with a gun, said: 16 
I don't believe anything that you are saying. The reason I don't believe you is 
because I don't believe that anything like this would happen to me. If I was 
you, and someone had threatened me with a gun, there is no way that I would 
continue to stay with them. There is no way that I could take that kind of 
abuse from them. Therefore, since I would not let that happen to me, I can't 
believe that it happened to you. 
The victim's perspective is also affected by the fact that she comes into contact 
with the legal system at the most dangerous time in the relationship. Abuse is a 
very strong reason for a victim to leave the relationship, however, competing 
against these considerations of safety, are the issues of financial dependence of 
the victim and her children upon the abuser, lack of confidence and self esteem 
due to continued emotional and psychological abuse, and the victim is generally 
well aware of the physical danger of leaving her partner. Homicide statistics 
show that when a woman is threatening to leave, or is actually leaving an 
15 Above n 1. 
16 R Graycar "The Relevance of Violence in Family Law Decision Making." (1995) 9 AJFL 
58, 61. 
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abusive partner is the most dangerous time for victims. 17 Separation is often 
devastating for abusive men, as they fear losing their control over their partner, 
and as a result II the marital relationship has been identified as potentially the 
most lethal in society. 11 18 
C Statistics 
Statistics about domestic abuse help to put the extent of the problem into 
perspective. National indicators about the prevalence of domestic abuse point to 
a major social problem: 
• Between 1978 and 1987, 47% of the 193 female homicide victims were 
lcilled by an existing or former male partner; there was a history of abuse in 
56% of these cases. 
• In 1990 under the Domestic Protection Act, the Family courts received 
3,393 applications for final non-molestation orders; and 2,409 applications 
for final non-violence orders; these figures do not include interim orders 
which would approximately quadruple the number of the non-molestation 
orders made, and treble the number of non-violence orders. 19 
• In 1991, 461 women were hospitalised for assault; it is estimated that more 
than one third of these cases were attributable to domestic abuse. 
• In 1992 there were 1,902 reported offences of common assault (domestic). 
• In 1992, the Police attended 21 ,093 domestic disputes. 
17 Women are most conunonly killed by t11eir abusive partners during or shortly after 
separation. 
18 D Chappell and H Strang "Domestic Violence - Findings and Reconunendations of ilie 
National Committee on Violence" Journal of Family Law 211 , 214. 
19 When t11e court grants a non-molestation order upon application, ilie order is an interim 
one. Orders do not become final until t11e court has heard any arguments against ilie order 
being made final. Recent statistics in ilie "Women's Safety Survey (Victimisation Survey 
Committee, Wellington, 1997), show iliat. a large nwnber of applicants for interim non-
molestation orders do not apply for the order to be made final , or the order is dismissed upon 
application from t11e respondent. Therefore t11e number of orders that are granted on first 
application is not reflected in t11e number of orders which are made final. Anotller reason for 
this is t11at a large number of applications for non-molestation and protection orders are made 
on an ex parte basis. Orders granted on an ex parte basis are temporary until t11e respondents 
case is heard. Only a small percentage of t110se orders sought and granted are actually made 
final by t11e courts. 
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• In 1992, breaches of non-molestation orders had risen to 1,066 from 675 in 
1987. 
• In 1992 5,148 women were admitted to women's refuges and a further 
6,638 women sought other kinds of support and assistance from women's 
refuges . 
• In March 1994, following the screenmg of "Not Just a Domestic" on 
national television, 1,309 people phoned the help-line for advice most 
speaking of their problem for the first time. 
• Estimates for the annual economic costs of family violence in New 
Zealand range from $1.189 billion to $5 .3 billion; these estimates use a 
broad-based definition including both physical and psychological abuse 
and defined "family" in an extended way. 20 
III IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS 
In the face of the statistics and the dangers associated with a victim of domestic 
abuse leaving her partner the law needs to comprehensively protect those 
women from the abuse from which they are attempting to escape. Furthermore 
the law needs to enable victims of domestic abuse to feel that they can leave 
their relationship, that the law will support them and enable them to be freed 
from the control of their abusive partners. In order to do this the law needs to 
begin by identifying and understanding what their needs are. 
The introduction of the Domestic Violence Act in 1995 has significantly 
improved the protective measures available to victims of a wide range of abuse. 
However the laws relating to property play a large role in determining whether 
victims can be effectively freed from the abuse that they have suffered. Women 
coming from abusive relationships have many emotional and psychological 
needs which need to be addressed, they also have the very practical and real 
needs of safe and adequate accommodation for them and their children, and the 
20 Above n 1, 31. 
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financial security to be independent of their partner. A maJor reason why 
women stay with abusive partners is because they are financially dependent. It is 
therefore vitally important that the law enables them to be as independent and 
separated from their abusive partner as is possible in the circumstances: :21 
One of the principal problems facing a party to the breakdown of a family 
relationship is accommodation. Who is to occupy the dwelling house where the 
family resided may become a cmcial question between the parties . The need for 
[immediate] accommodation tends to be even greater for a victim of domestic 
violence. 
Studies into the effects of separation and divorce on the living standards of the 
respective partners of a relationship have shown that the wife's living standard 
drops dramatically after separation or divorce, especially where they also have 
custody of the children. The Working Group on Matrimonial Property and 
Family Protection22 found that the basis of equality underpinning the 
Matrimonial Property Act 1976 may lead to a lack of equity between the 
parties. The presumption of the 50/50 split in matrimonial property has failed to 
create equal living standards. 23 
There are two main reasons for this: 
a) The domestic role played by the majority of women within the mamage 
relationship, has led to a reduced earning capacity. This is caused by the long 
absence from the workforce, and the sacrifice of career opportunities. 
b) Women are most commonly the custodial parent. This results in a three-fold 
fall in living standards. 
(i) Custody often creates an obligation of full time child care. This means 
that women are either unable to obtain work, or the income is 
insufficient to support the family. 
2 1 Butterwort11s Family Law Service Commentary, Number 29, para 7.630. 
22 The Working Group on Matrimonial Property and Family Protection 1988 
23 Above n 22, 4. 
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(ii) The proceeds of a half share of the matrimonial home and other 
matrimonial property are generally not sufficient to purchase other 
suitable accommodation for the mother and children. Her level of 
income is generally insufficient to obtain a mortgage, therefore the 
mother is forced to live in rental accommodation, generally of a much 
lower standard than the matrimonial home. 
(iii) The need to live in rental accommodation means that the capital 
gained from the equal division is consumed, leaving the mother less 
capable of obtaining permanent housing. 24 
The property needs that arise when a victim leaves an abusive relationship can 
be categorised into three groups: immediate needs, short term needs and long 
term needs 
IV IMMEDIATE NEEDS 
As discussed before, separation is a time of danger for victims, therefore the 
law needs to have provisions to protect and provide for these women 
immediately, in such a way as to ensure that they are not endangered any 
further. It does this by means of ex parte orders ( orders without notice to the 
other party). 
The immediate need is for safe accommodation. In order to achieve this the 
victim will often need to utilise the whole range of ex parte orders; protection 
orders, occupation or tenancy orders and furniture orders. These orders are all 
available under the DV A. 
24 Above n 22, 5 
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A Ex parte Occupation Orders 
s60(1) An occupation order may be granted on an ex parte application, only if 
the court is satisfied that: 
(a) The respondent has physically or sexually abused the applicant or a child 
of the applicant's family; and 
(b) The delay that would be caused be proceedings on notice would or might 
expose the applicant or a child of the applicant's family to physical or 
sexual abuse. 
s60(3) of the DVA also stipulates that an application for an ex parte occupation 
or tenancy order may only be granted if the court makes a protection order 
at the same time, unless the court considers that there are special reasons for 
not making the protection order. 
When an occupation order is granted on an ex parte application, the applicant is 
granted an interim order until either the respondent is heard, or the court makes 
the order final. 
Under section 76 of the DVA the respondent is entitled to notify the court that 
he wishes to be heard regarding whether a final order should be made. The Act 
also establishes procedures for making final any orders made on an ex parte 
application, including the power to require that the order not be made final 
without a hearing involving representation of both the parties. If the respondent 
does not wish to challenge the order being made final, then the order will 
become final by operation of law after 3 months. 25 
Ex parte orders do not require that the applicant show proof of the alleged 
abuse, there is a presumption that the applicant's claim is substantiated. This 
enables the court to be able to protect the safety of the applicant. 26 If the 
25 Refer to s 60(2) of the Domestic Violence Act 1995. 
26 S Edwards and A Halpern The Progress Towards Protection (1992) NLJ 798. 
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applicant is being truthful about the violence and the risk of further harm, and 
the court does not believe her and therefore does not grant the order, then there 
is the risk that the law will fail in its role of protector. The need to grant the 
order 'just in case' is reinforced by the fact that a violent spouse is extremely 
likely to abuse his partner when he learns of her attempt to leave him and 
remove herself and any children from his control. 
This presumption is justified by the fact that ex parte orders are only temporary, 
if the allegations prove groundless then the order will be removed as soon as the 
respondent's case has been heard. In the interim the law must err on the side of 
caution lest it allow a tragedy to occur. 
B Ex parte Tenancy Orders 
The criteria for ex parte tenancy orders are the same criteria used to grant an 
ex parte occupation order. 27 however the property to which the order may be 
applied and the effect of the order differ greatly. 
Under the DV A the property which is subject to occupation and tenancy orders 
has been extended to include all property in which the parties have a legal 
interest. Occupation orders apply to all dwelling houses 28 which either party 
owns or has a legal interest in at the time of the order. Occupation orders may 
not be made on property where the parties only have a beneficial interest. 29 
Tenancy orders apply to any dwelling house of which at the time that the order 
is made the other party to the proceedings is -
(a) Sole tenant; or 
(b) A tenant holding jointly, Or in common, with the applicant. 
27 I have outlined tl1c criteria for ex parle occupations orders above. 
28 De.fined in s2 of tl1e DVA; Dwelling house includes -
(a) Any flal or lown house, whether or not occupied pursuant to a licence to 
occupy witltin tl1e meaning of section 121A of tlle land Transfer Actl952 : 
(b) Any mobile home, caravan or otl1er means of shelter placed or erected upon 
any land and intended for occupation on tllat land. 
29 See Wells v The ramify Court [1995] NZFLR 149. 
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If a tenancy order is granted, then it is taken to also apply to any furniture and 
other household effects which are let with the property and the land and 
buildings included in the tenancy. 30 
When a tenancy order is granted it has the effect of making the applicant the 
sole tenant subject to all the normal conditions of a tenancy. 
31 It allows the 
occupant to exclude all others from the property including the respondent but 
does not affect the rights of third parties in the property. 
32 
C Ex parte Protection Orders 
s 13 ( 1) A Protection order may be made on an application without notice, if the 
court is satisfied that the delay that would be caused by proceedings on notice 
would or might entail -
(a) A risk of harm; or 
(b) Undue Hardship -
to the applicant or a child of the applicant's family, or both. 
(2) ... the court must have regard to -
(a) the perception of the applicant or a child of the applicant's family, or both, of 
the nature and seriousness of the respondent's behaviour; and 
(b) the effect of that behaviour on the applicant or a child of the applicant's 
family, or both. 
As is reflected in the presumption that an occupation or tenancy order will not 
be granted without a protection order, the need for 'safe' accommodation cannot 
be fully met with just an occupation order. 33 The law must also emphasise that 
the respondent is to have nothing to do with the applicant, and that the law has 
found the applicant is in need of protection from the actions of the respondent. 
30 Refer to s 56(2) DV A. 
3 1 A tenancy which is subject to a tenancy order can be terminated and affected just as with a 
normal tenancy t11e rights of land lord and tenant do not change in respect of their 
relationship to each ot11er. 
32 Fisher on Matrimonial Property (3ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1996.) 
para. 7.639. 
33 Butterworths Paragraph 7.632. 
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D Problems with Ex parte Orders 
The court in Q v Q 34 held that the test for ex parte orders is a 'rigorous test.' 35 
The court held that the fact that the applicant was able to go to the presumptive 
safety of a refuge, until an application could be bought on notice, meant that 
she did not satisfy the test. The delay occasioned by a hearing on notice would 
therefore not expose her or her children to risk as she had an alternative housing 
arrangement. 
While the development of refuges and safe houses is a great development in the 
protection and assistance of victims of domestic abuse, and the role that they 
play is to be applauded, there is a danger that the court may see their existence 
as an easy alternative to having to deal with the needs of victims to be provided 
with safe and adequate accommodation while they work their way through the 
process ofleaving their abusive partner. 
The dispossession of a person on the basis of unproved allegations is a very 
serious matter and should not be a step that is lightly entered into, however the 
accommodation provided by grossly under funded agencies such as women's 
refuge is far from adequate for the needs of a family. 36 
Another problem that has been identified in relation to ex parte orders is the 
length of time that it takes for the respondent to be heard. When the interim 
order is made on the basis of what are sometimes unsubstantiated allegations, 37 
this can cause undue hardship for the respondent, dispossessed and stigmatised 
for an unacceptably long period of time. 
34 Q v Q [1994] 12 FRNZ 46. 
35 Above n 34, 51. 
36 Refuge safe houses comprise of a house with 5-6 room in which 5-6 people live. They are 
obliged to live in cramped and far from private conditions, and to deal witl1 all tl1e stresses 
and strains tl1at tltis places on the family, at a time of great upheaval and emotional turmoil. 
37 It is not clear how oft.en this occurs. However tl1e differentiation between the number of 
interim orders granted and those made final may give an indication that 
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E Conclusions 
The law has put into practice comprehensive measures to provide for the 
immediate protection of victims of domestic abuse. However, if the court 
follows theory in Q v Q 38 and holds that a woman is not in need if she can go to 
the safety of a refuge, then when will a woman ever qualify for an ex parte 
occupation order. The court needs to carefully balance the right of the 
respondent not to be unreasonably disadvantaged with a reasonable judgment of 
when the alternatives open to a woman are adequate. 39 I would submit that the 
availability of a shelter should not be sufficient to exclude a woman from an ex 
parte order as it is not reasonable to expect a woman and children to live in 
those conditions for anything other than an emergency situation. 
V SHORT TERM NEEDS 
Not all relationships involving domestic abuse will require that the application 
for occupation or tenancy orders be made ex parte, nor will ex parte 
applications always be granted. For those women, the need for immediate 
accommodation and safety is replaced by a concern for their needs in the short 
term. 
The need for safe and adequate accommodation is the same, however the 
criteria and issues associated with property orders gained on notice, are vastly 
different. 
38 Above n 34. 
39 This is a very difficult balance to strike. I would submit that the availability of a refuge is 
only a valid alternative where the court can guarantee that the issue will be heard within a 
short period of time and that there is actually a refuge place available for that period of time. 
Alternatively if this is not available for that period of time then the presumption needs to be in 
the applicants favour witJ1 a hearing of the respondents case at an early opportunity. 
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A Orders Under the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 
Orders for occupation and tenancy can be granted under both the Domestic 
Violence Act (DV A) and the Matrimonial Property Act (MP A). Of these two, 
the MP A is both the least restrictive and the most discretionary. 
1 Criteria. 
The criteria for granting an occupation order are outlined in section 27. 
The court may make an order granting to the husband of the wife, for 
such period or periods and on such terms and subject to such conditions 
as the court thinks fit, the right personally to occupy the matrimonial 
home or any other premises forming part of the matrimonial property. 40 
This extremely broad power must be read subject to section 25(2) : 41 
The court shall not make an order pursuant to subsection (1) of this 
section unless it is satisfied that : 
(a) The husband and wife are living apart (whether or not they have 
continued to live in the same residence) or are separated; or 
(b) the Marriage of the husband and the wife has been dissolved; or 
( c) One spouse by gross mismanagement or by wilful or reckless 
dissipation of Property or earnings, is endangering the matrimonial 
property or seriously diminishing its value; or 
( d) the husband or the wife is an undischarged bankrupt. 
Section 25 determines when the court can make an order under the Act. In 
Stocker, 42 Stacey J held that there is no jurisdiction to make an occupation 
order without the parties being separated or living apart. Section 25(3) allows 
40 s27(1) Matrimonial Properly Act 1976. 
41 Stocker v Stocker (1978) l MPC 200. 
42 Above n 41. 
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that court to make an order relating to specific property where it considers it 
just to do so, without the parties being separated. However the court Richards 
v Richards 43 held that such an order should not be made without reference to 
the general property rights, and should not be made where there is no indication 
of the general property matters being resolved. 
Section 28A completes the list of criteria by requiring that the decision-maker 
"have particular regard to the need to provide a home for any minor dependent 
child of the marriage and may also have regard to all other relevant 
circumstances." The presence of violence in the relationship could therefore be 
considered as a relevant circumstance establishing whether to grant the order in 
the applicants favour. 
2 Effect of the order. 
The effect of an occupation order is to grant the recipient the right to exclusive 
occupation of the matrimonial property. This means to the exclusion of the 
other partner of the marriage. The provisions only apply to the parts of the 
property that are used for domestic use, and not for business, this specifically 
applies to farm property. The court also has the power under s27 to place 
whatever terms and conditions it sees fit upon the order. Occupation orders are 
generally temporary in nature, although they can be extended to cover the 
schooling of all the children's secondary schooling, making them of a significant 
length. 
An occupation order can also act as a form of secured maintenance, providing 
continued support for one partner at the cost of the other. 44 
Section 46 of the Matrimonial Property Act ensures that the rights of mortgages 
43 Richards v Richards (1982) 1 NZFLR 243. 
44 Above n 32. The ability of tl1e wife to occupy the matrimonial home to tl1e exclusion of the 
husband means that tl1e applicant gains the monetary benefit of not being required to pay for 
rental accommodation. This acts as a substitute for payments of maintenance, and is 
considered to be secured as the applicant has the security of the home rather than payments 
which are often difficult to obtain. 
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are not affected by occupation or tenancy orders. Section 46 states that: 
the rights conferred on the husband or the wife by any order made under this 
Act shall be subject to the rights of the persons entitled to the benefit of any 
mortgage, security, charge, or encumbrance affecting the property in respect 
of which the order is made if it was registered before the order was registered 
of if the rights of that person arise under an instrument executed before the 
date of the making of the order. 
Therefore an occupation or tenancy order will not detrimentally affect the right 
of an interest holder. 
The Act also addresses the potential problem of mortgage holders calling up the 
mortgage on the basis of the order. The Act stipulates that an interest cannot be 
called up solely on the basis of the order being made. This ensures that the order 
remains effective. 
3. Problems. 
The criteria are generally thought to limit the application of such orders to 
couples who have been legally married and are separated or divorced. This 
provision is therefore of little use to a victim in an existing abusive relationship, 
she does not receive any assistance in leaving her abusive partner. Fear of his 
reaction to the separation will encourage her to remain with her partner rather 
then take the risk of what his reaction may be. 
The concept of secured maintenance also goes against the principal of allowing 
the parties a 'clean break', which is integral to the MP A The certainty and 
finality created by the equal sharing presumption under the MP A has been 
applauded as it enables the parties to achieve a clean break from each other . 
Occupation orders go against this concept by preventing the sale of the 
matrimonial home for a period of time. This has the effect of continuing the 
connection of the parties through their interest in the matrimonial home. This 
problem is one of finality . The case for a clean break, which can be said to be 
stronger in situations of domestic abuse as the victim needs to be able to 
completely separate herself from the control of her partner. However until the 
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issue of shares in the property is finally resolved the accommodation order 
overcomes the need for a clean break 
I will discuss the problems common to both Acts in section 4. 
B Orders Under the Domestic Violence Act 1995 45 
The purpose and scope of the MP A and the DV A differ greatly, and while the 
court has been granted power under both statutes the purpose and criteria for 
each diverge. 
1 Purpose of the Act. 
The long title of the Act states that it is II An Act to provide greater protection 
from domestic violence. 11 In contrast to the MP A it is not designed to deal with 
the division of property after separation Its purpose is to protect. 
Occupation orders are granted to provide the victim and any dependent children 
of the family with safe accommodation. The most efficient way the court can 
fulfil these joint needs, is to allow the victim to remain in occupation of the 
matrimonial home. This 1s generally the only realistic accommodation 
alternative for the victim and any children. 
2. Criteria 
The test for granting an occupation order consists of a two stages: 
S21(1) On hearing an application for an occupation order, the court 
may, make an order granting to the applicant, for such period or 
45 The cases I will refer to are based upon the Domestic Protection Act 1982 which has now 
been repealed. The wording if the relevant sections has remained the same and so the 
arguments and tests arising from these cc1ses is still relevant to the Domestic Violence Act. 
Where cases on the Domestic Violence Act have been decided those have been used. 
periods, and on such terms and subject to such conditions as the court 
thinks fit, the right personally to occupy the household residence or any 
other premises forming part of the household residence. 
S21(2) The court may make an order under subsection (1) of this 
section only if the court is satisfied that such an order-
(a) Is necessary for the protection of the applicant; or 
(b) Is in the best interests of a child of the family 
(a) The meaning of "necessary for the protection of'. 
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The meaning of this phrase has been carefully considered and defined in case 
law. Judge Inglis , defined 'protection' in a series of three cases, Mantell v 
Mantell, 46 Woodley v Harding 47 and Beswick v Beswick 48 . He found that the 
term protection had a wide and liberal interpretation. 
Mantell v Mantell 49 involved no molestation, harassment, or physical 
violence. It required the court to decide: 50 
whether an occupation order could be made in favour of a wife who needed 
protection not from the husband but from a situation of intolerable stress that had 
developed in the home [He] interpreted the words in s 21(2)(a) 'is necessary for 
the protection of the applicant", as including protection from avoidable emotional 
or mental harm arising simply from disintegration of the marriage. The need for 
protection need not necessarily be related to acts or conduct of the respondent: it 
can also be related to the applicant's response to the situation created by the 
applicant's and the respondent's relationship. 
This very broad interpretation has been confirmed in further case law. The court 
has gone on to find that 'protection' covers, stress that causes bodily harm, 
stating that "unkindness and insensitivity aimed at a spouse can be just as, if not 
more damaging to health than physical blows. "51 Beswick 52 confirmed that 
protection included the situation rather than the conduct of the other party, 
46 Mantell v Mantell (Unreported, Family Court, Lower Hutt, 13 November 1984, FP 
032/194/84 ). 
47 Woodley v Harding (1984) 3 NZFLR 234. 
48 Beswick v Beswick (1984) 3 NZFLR 289. 
49 Above n46. 
50 Beauchamp v Beauchamp (1985) 3 NZFLR 516, 521. 
51 Smith v Smith (1992) 9 FRNZ 605, 605. 
52 Above n 48. 
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Woodley v Harding 53 confirmed that the respondent's response to the situation 
was enough to satisfy the criteria, and in Beauchamp v Beauchamp 54 Judge 
Bisphan extended the interpretation to include protection from homelessness 
and financial hardship. 
The apparently unlimited interpretation of "protection" has found some limits 
within the case law. Although Judge Bisphan, found that homelessness and 
financial hardship were covered, he stated that although the categories of 
protection are perhaps never closed, that: 55 
there must however exist a discernible and indeed provable state or condition 
from which the applicant ought to be protected. The state or condition must 
arise in the conte>,.'t of the domestic situation . The making of the order must be 
warranted in light of the state or condition from which protection is sought. A 
desire by the applicant to end a failing relationship by having the respondent 
removed from the home where the is no violence, molestation or other 
compelling reason is not enough. 
(b) Best Interests of a Child of the Family. 
The "best interests" standard is common in family law, and can be found in 
many of the key statutes. 56 The discretionary nature of this part of the criteria, 
means that the scope is extremely wide, it allows for a very wide range of 
factors to be taken into account. 
As a general rule, this criterion will be satisfied where there is no good 
alternative accommodation available for the children. This is commonly satisfied 
in the situation of domestic violence as the nature of the relationship is one of 
control. The victim is generally not able to support herself financially as a result 
of the impact of the abuse and control. However this will generally apply only 
where the applicant has been made to leave the matrimonial home by the 
53 Above n 47. 
54 Above n 50. 
55 Above n 50, 522. 
56 The best interests of the child must be considered when making orders under the 
Matrimonial Property Act 1976, and the Guardianship Act. 
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conduct of the abusive partner or the situation. It will not be open to applicants 
who choose to leave the matrimonial home for their own ease and comfort. 
The scope appears to be limitless, however it is now accepted that it must relate 
to their physical, emotional and psychological welfare, their stability and their 
accommodation needs. 57 However it is not appropriate to apply a legalistic and 
restrictive interpretation where the best interests of children are at stake." 58 
(c) Overriding Discretion. 
Once all the criteria have been fulfilled, the court still has an overriding 
discretion as to whether they will grant the occupation order. 59 
In determining whether to make the order, the court must consider all the 
relevant circumstances, and make an order that is just and fair, to both the 
applicant and the respondent. 
A number of factors, other than the protection of the applicant or the best 
interests of the child, may be relevant, including health and age of the parties, 
the personal connection to the property, the importance of the home to the 
occupation of one of the parties, the financial consequences of the decision on 
all the parties, the parties conduct and the nature and duration of the 
relationship between the parties. 60 It is also important that the court looks not 
at the ideals but at the realities of the situation. 
3. Effect of the order. 
While the legal effect of an occupation order under the DV A is essentially the 
same as under the MP A there are also many other personal effects on the 
applicant, respondent, the children of the family, and their relationship. 
57 Above n 50. Th.is phrase however is not restricted to the effects of violence, molestation or 
domestic disharmony on the children. 
58 Above n 50, 522. 
59 S21 Domestic Protection Act 1982. 
60 Above n 21 , 7640. 
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• The ability to exclude the abusive partner from the home can create a feeling 
of safety and security for the applicant and the children. 
• Maintains a settled environment for any children of the family as they are 
able to remain in their home and attend the same school and remain in the 
same familiar surroundings. 
• The order overturns the right to consortium, which exists between married 
couples. 61 
• The court recognises the need to use this power to prevent people from 
using their own bad conduct to force their partners to leave the home at the 
disintegration of the relationship . Guest J, supports this, "I also think that 
where one spouse has been dispossessed as a result of violence, then the 
court ought to be quick to protect that person against what might appear to 
be might being right." 62 
• An occupation order is not a permanent solution to the problem of security, 
it has been described as both a 'Band-Aid' and a 'stop gap measure' . 
63 It will 
need to be finalised and will always be subject to variation and removal upon 
application. I will discuss this in more detail later. 
• Granting of an occupation order also has negative consequences for the 
applicant, specifically in the context of domestic violence. An occupation 
order only grants the right to exclusive possession. The victim of the 
violence is not allowed to rent or lease the property, and must live in it or 
the order will be removed. This can create hardship in finding sufficient 
income to maintain the property, especially any mortgage on the property. It 
is also a problem in that most victims do not want to remain in the home 
where they have been abused. It can be detrimental to their emotional and 
psychological welfare. 
• Occupation of the family home may also prove to undermine one of the 
purposes for which it was made, the protection of the applicant and any 
61 The right of consortium has been addressed in Dawson v Dawson (1984) 3 NZFLR 353. 
The right of consortium relates to the rights of married couples to the companionship and 
society. It also includes tJ1e right to live together in tJ1e matrimonial home. 
62 Woodv Campbell (1988) 4 NZFLR 533 , 535. 
63 Refer Woodv Campbell (1988) 4 NZFLR 533; Beauchamp v Beauchamp (1985) 3 NZFLR 
516. 
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children. If the violent partner is dispossessed, he is likely to be resentful of 
the order. This will compound any possible feelings of anger, uncertainty 
and resentment over the separation and loss of control over his partner. In 
this situation the abuser will know the whereabouts of his partner, and have 
an intimate knowledge of the layout and security of the property. The risk of 
danger to the abused partner in this kind of situation is great. 
• As with the MP A the DV A also provides protection for he rights of 
mortgagees and other interest holders. Section 75 ensures that if the interest 
was obtained before the order was made that they occupation or tenancy 
order does not affect that interest, other than stipulating that the interest 
holder may not call up the interest on the basis of the order. 
4 Problems under the Domestic Violence Act. 
On consideration of the provision in the DP A it becomes clear that there are 
some general problems that need to be addressed if the act is going to satisfy the 
need of victims of domestic violence. 
a) The court has the power to place whatever terms and conditions it thinks fit 
upon the recipient of the occupation order. These conditions can quite 
often seen totally arbitrary. 
In Redward v Redward 64 the court held that it could vary the occupation 
granted to the wife, and as a result they excluded her friend from entering the 
property. The court found that the husband's extreme jealousy and anger over 
his wife's friend, was not in the best interests if the children and so ordered that 
the mend be excluded to protect the children. 
In so doing, the court aided the husband in his continued control over his wife, 
and rewarded his extreme and violent behaviour. I do not disagree that the 
situation was unhealthy for the children, however I believe that this was not an 
appropriate means of dealing with the situation. 
64 Redwardv Redward (1987) 2 FRNZ 456. 
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In Dawson v Dawson 65 the court granted an occupation, and ordered that the 
applicant attend counselling 66 and suggested that this was a suitable case for 
mediation 67 . There are a vast number of issues and problems associated with 
mediation and joint counselling in the presence of domestic violence, especially 
mandatory participation. The main issue that needs to be understood here, is 
that in a relationship of domestic violence, the underlying problem is not that 
the abuser cannot control his temper, it is that the abuser feels the need to 
control his partner, and does this through using violence to gain submission. 
Therefore mediation and counselling not only create a situation of risk and 
discomfort by forcing the victim to have contact with her abusive partner, there 
are also serious questions as to the possible effectiveness of these sessions. If 
the mediation and counselling is not effective then there is no benefit to 
outweigh the detriment to the victim. 
Under the DVA section 31 states that parties shall not be compelled to attend 
programme sessions where the other is present. Programmes as defined in 
section 2 of the DV A are those which have the objective of protecting the 
victim, or stopping or preventing the abuser from being violent. Counselling 
sessions involving both the parties would fall with in these criteria. Whether 
this section and its implications apply to mediation will be discussed in part VI. 
The continuance of an occupation order is revisable if the recipient changes the 
victims living position. Meaning that she is unable to build a new life, while 
continuing in the minimal security that the order does provide. 
65 Dawson v Dawson (1985) 3 NZFLR 353. 
66 Section 10 of the Family Proceedings Act states that upon application for a separation order 
the registrar shall arrange for counselling. Sub section (2)(b) allows a Family Court Judge to 
give a direction that the parties do not have to attend counselling on the ground that the 
respondent has used violence against, or used bodily harm to the applicant or child of the 
marriage or has threatened to do so. This does not mean that the curt cannot order 
counselling, but there is an indication that counselling in the presence of violence is not 
advisable. 
67 I will deal with the implications of Mediation in tl1e presence of domestic abuse in detail in 
part VI. 
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This power to vary and place conditions is also compounded by the temporary 
nature of the remedy. It may fulfil a temporary need for accommodation but it 
does not allow the victim to rebuild her life. 
The discretionary nature of the order has caused injustice for both the applicant 
and the respondent. The courts have in my opinion extended the criteria of 
protection too far. To dispossess one partner is a drastic move, to do so 
through no fault of their own on the basis that their partner feels extremely 
stressed by the breakdown of the relationship, can lead to injustice for the 
respondent. 
Injustice has also been created for the applicant. The discretion has led to 
inconsistency and uncertainty in the application of the law. However this need 
for certainty and consistency needs to be balanced with enough flexibility to deal 
with each individual situation. The Act clearly spells out what orders are 
available. This means that the Act may prove difficult to apply in some 
situations. 
The final problem with the property orders under the DV A is that they do not 
take precedence over other orders. A DV A order can be over ridden by an 
order for sale under the MP A. 68 It can also be subject to an order for sale 
under section 140 of the Property Law Act, in the case of de facto marriages. 
69 
C Changes made by tlte Domestic Violence Act. 
The introduction of the Domestic Violence Act 1995 (DV A) solved some of 
the problems which existed under the Domestic Protection Act. There have 
been some major changes in the purpose and object of the Act, and in the way 
that the provisions operate. 
68 Above n 21 , para 7.632. 
69 Above n 21 , para 7.632. The DVA applies to all domestic relationships as defined within 
the Act including De facto marriages. 
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Some of the more important changes include: 
• Increasing the application of occupation orders to cover all dwelling houses 
in which either party has a legal interest. 
70 
• The act has extended the people to whom the act applies. It now includes 
domestic relationships, which are not in the nature of marriage. 7 1 
• The act has been extended to protect children of the applicants, rather than 
children of the family, which required that they had been part of the family 
relationship. 72 
• The court must now have regard to the reasonable accommodation needs of 
all the parties. This has helped alleviate some of the injustice suffered by 
respondents. For example under the 1982 Act the court orders could have 
been made against a husband who did not have a job and would have 
difficulty finding an accommodation for hjmself, where as ms partner, 
although deserving of the occupation order, was capable of finding and 
paying for suitable alternative accommodation without the need for the 
matrimonial home. 
• The grounds for ex parte applications have been extended to include sexual 
abuse as defined in the Act as well as physical violence. 
73 
• The joining of non-violence and non-molestation orders into protection 
orders has aided the flexjbility of the Act, enabling orders to provide for all 
the protection needs within the scope and application of one order. 
These changes have dealt with many of the problems which arose under the 
Domestic Protection Act and has been a good development in the law. However 
there are problems with exjsted in the DP A which have not been remedied 
under the DV A I will deal with these in my conclusion. 
70 Refer to s 2, DV A. 
71 The Act now covers all parties who are in a domestic relationship. This includes all family 
relationships, such as siblings and parent/child relationships, flatmates and other domestic 
relationships. The Act does not allow orders to be made against children though, unless they 
are married. Refer Section 2, DVA. 
72 Refer s 53 DV A. 
73 Refers 4, DV A. 
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D Tenancy Orders Under the Matrimonial Property Act 1976. 
As with Ex parte occupation orders the criteria for occupation and tenancy 
orders are essentially the same. 
E Furniture Orders 
Orders allowing the possession of furniture and other household items are 
available under both the DV A and the MP A. 
s28B The court may make an order granting to the person in whose favour 
the order is or has been made the use, for such period, and on such terms, and 
subject to such conditions as the court thinks fit, of all or any of the household 
furniture or household appliances, effects, or equipment in the matrimonial 
home or other premises to which the order made under section 27(1) of this Act 
relates or in the dwelling house to which the order made under section 28( 1) of 
this Act relates. 74 
This section allows the court a wide discretion to grant a furniture order, and it 
will generally do so when an occupation or tenancy order is granted. 
The DVA allows broadly the same discretion for making furniture orders, 
however this power is divided between ancillary furniture orders 
75 and furniture 
orders. 76 
The court may grant an ancillary furniture order with the occupation or tenancy 
order only if it is satisfied that both the applicant and the respondent lived 
together in the dwelling house; or that a child of the applicant's is or will be 
living in the specified dwelling house. 
74 Refer Los 28B of the Malrimonial Property Acl 1976. 
75 Refer to s 63 of t11e DVA. 
76 Refer to s 66 oflhe DVA. 
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Furniture orders under section 66 are not related to an occupation or tenancy 
order, but are dependant upon the court granting a protection order. A furniture 
order expires along with the protection, occupation or tenancy order which it is 
attached to . 
Furniture orders affect furniture, household appliances, and household effects. 
Personal items are not included. Any furniture which is subject to the order is 
able to be traced to a third party and the rights of the applicant apply to 
furniture that has been removed since the application was made. The order is 
subject to the rights of a third party and does not make those rights invalid. 
77 
F Conclusions 
The law is still not fully meeting the need for safe and secure accommodation. 
Occupation orders are only a temporary measure and are subject to a number 
of restrictions, the most unsettling of which is the ability of the court to place 
what ever terms and conditions on the order that it thinks fit. This has been 
seen to include a variation to exclude the occupant from having certain 
visitors, 78 and orders for mandatory counselling. 
79 It also extends to placing 
conditions as to who is responsible for the payment of the mortgage and 
household expenses, conditions as to certain pieces of property that are still 
open tot he respondent, the length of the order and the conditions upon which 
it can be terminated, such as remarriage, formation of a de facto marriage and 
the children finishing their education. The occupant may even have to account 
to her partner for the use of his share of the property. 
80 The need for complete 
safety not just physically but also to feel protected, is still not being achieved 
and therefore the Act is failing to provide the greater protection it was designed 
to do. The DV A does provide a much needed temporary solution to the 
77 This means U1at if there is a hire purchase agreement on U1e property or some other security 
that the right is not affected by the order. Above n 21 , para 7.644. 
78 Above n 64. 
79 Above n 65 . 
80 Above n 32, para 7.643. 
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problem of accommodation in a lot of cases, but there needs to be an increased 
awareness of the temporary and limited nature of the provisions. An occupation 
order under the DV A cannot provide any lasting security. 
This really can only be addressed by allowing victims the ability to begin their 
lives afresh, and to be certain that they are free from the control of their abusive 
partner. 
VI LONG TERM NEEDS 
Victims of abusive relationships need to develop a full understanding of what 
their long term needs will be, and the extent and effectiveness of their options in 
meeting those needs. 
Occupation and tenancy orders are still not a long term solution for victims of 
domestic abuse, even when they are made final. It is important that victims are 
able to separate themselves from the control of their abusive partner, and this 
cannot be achieved by occupying a house which he has a legal interest in. 
Victims need to be able to be financially independent, both in where they live 
and in their means of support. The only way for the victims to achieve this is to 
either obtain a job which provides a sufficient income to begin again, (for the 
reasons shown in part II this is not generally a viable option) or, use the 
property existing in the marriage to develop a new start, with settled 
accommodation and total independence from their abusive partner. 
In part II I outlined the findings on the poverty often suffered by women upon 
separation. It has become clear over the years that an equal division of the 
matrimonial property will generally not be sufficient to enable the victim to 
become financially independent. In order for the law to assist victims of abuse to 
become financially independent, it needs to provide for a departure from the 
presumption of equal sharing. 
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Married couples have several alternatives open to them in deciding how to 
divide the matrimonial property, I will deal with each of them in turn. 
A Litigation under the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 
1 The Equal Sharing Presumption 
The 1976 Act was a step forward in recogrusmg that the performance of 
household tasks and the care of children, were of an equal value to financial 
contributions to the marriage partnership. Both parties were presumed to have 
contributed equally to the marriage, and therefore should share equally in all 
acquired property. Any departure from that presumption could only be done 
according to the specific exceptions provided within the Act. 81 
2 Marriages of Short Duration 
Section 13 of the MP A allows for the equal sharing presumption to be 
displaced, in relation to the matrimonial home and family chattels, when the 
marriage has been of a short duration. 'Short duration' is defined in section 
13(3) as being where the spouses have lived together for a period of less than 
three years. 
This prov1s1on allows for property bought to the mamage wholly or 
substantially by one party, or inherited during the marriage, to be removed from 
the application of equal sharing. It also allows for consideration of the 
contributions of the spouses, if the contribution of one, has been 
disproportionately greater than the other spouse. This is one possible way in 
which victims of abusive relationships may be able to get a greater share of the 
property. 
81 Above n 32. 
35 
Where the marriage has been short in length, then the application of this section 
is straight forward. Furthermore the section extends to cover situations where 
the marriage has been for a longer period of time, but the couple can be 
considered not to have been living together, either because they have not been 
cohabiting, or because the nature of the relationship is so broken down that they 
are not considered to be living in a marriage-like relationship. The court has the 
discretion under section 13(3) to allow longer relationships if it considers it just 
to do so. 82 
Upon finding that there are grounds for a departure from equal sharing, the 
division of property will be divided according to contribution to the marriage 
partnership. 
3 Extraordinary Circumstances 
The second exception to the equal sharing presumption is where there are 
extraordinary circumstances that in the opinion of the court, render repugnant 
to justice the equal sharing between the spouses of any property to which 
section 11 applies. 83 
There has been much debate as to what constitutes extraordinary circumstances, 
84 the Court in Martin v Martin 85 considered these approaches. and concluded 
that you could not take any of the concepts in isolation of the others, but rather 
had to consider what they meant when read together. 
82 Above n 32. 
83 Refer to s 14 MPA. Section 11 regulates the division of U1e matrimonial home and the 
family chattels. 
84 The second school of iliought can be seen in Beven v Beven (1977) 2 MPC 23 . White J 
thought: Urnt U1e words "ex1.raordinary" and "repugnant" were simply intended to show that 
U1e exception would arise when it is seen that "the new general rule of equal sharing would be 
clearly unjust" .. .In my opinion, the section cam10t be interpreted as meaning U1at something 
less Ulan justice will be tolerated but simply that the onus rests on the spouse who asserts to 
demonstrate Urnt U1e general rule of equal sharing would be unjust in the particular case 
because of ex1.raordinary circmnstances. The focus here is on U1e concept of justice rather U1an 
"extraordinary" or "repugnant". 
85 Martin v Martin [1979] 1 NZLR 97. 
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Woodhouse J said that: 86 
If the Legislative intention had been no more than to define a simple situation 
"where circumstances make the equal sharing between the spouses unjust", 
then those very words could have been used. Instead the circumstances must 
be so "extraordinary" that they would "render repugnant to justice" an 
application of the general rule in favour of equality. 
The case law has not yet addresses the issue of whether violence or other abuse 
within a relationship can constitute 'extraordinary circumstances. There have 
however been extreme cases involving the murder of the children of the family 
where the court has been called upon to decide if the situation fulfils the 
criterion. 
In MacKenzie v MacKenzie 87 the husband applied under section 14 to have the 
proceeds of the matrimonial home divided on the basis of contribution due to 
the extraordinary circumstances of the case. In this case the wife, who was 
mentally ill, murdered the children of the marriage in the home. 
The court looked at the extent to which the event had affected the value of the 
matrimonial home, and whether that effect warranted a departure from equal 
sharing. 
The court found that the events which had transpired within the home had 
considerably affected the value of the house, as any real estate agent would be 
obliged to disclose to all prospective buyers the events which had taken place, 
decreasing the potential value of the property. Judge Bisphan said "I do no 
doubt that for one moment that the killing of these three children by the wife is 
an extraordinary circumstance" and agreed with counsel for the husband who 
stated that, "If the circumstances of this case did not constitute "extraordinary 
circumstances" in tern1s of s 14 the section could have no application" 
86 Above n 85, 102. 
87 MacKenzie v MacKenzie (1984) 3 NZFLR 79. 
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In Money v Money 88 the father threw the children of the marriage off the 
Auckland Harbour Bridge, then jumped himself. The husband was rescued but 
the children died. The wife, relying on the decision in Mackenzie, 89 applied for a 
departure from equal sharing under section 14. In this case the court found that 
the fact that the murder had been committed away from the home, meant that 
they extent of the affect on the value of the home, was not sufficient to render 
the extraordinary circumstances repugnant to justice. 
These two cases, therefore, clearly states the law in this area. Even in such an 
extreme situation as the murder of the children of a marriage, the court will not 
allow departure from equal sharing unless there has been a significant effect 
upon the value of the property. 
Therefore in the case of abuse in a marriage relationship, the abuse would need 
to be both extraordinary and have an effect upon the value of the matrimonial 
property, to meet the requirements of s 14. 
Fisher 90 identifies another possible argument for victims of abuse under s14. 
The case of Iv J 91 the wife had entered into an adulterous relationship not long 
after the marriage had begun. The court held that her action had the effect of 
dooming the relationship . Where these actions were added to disparate financial 
contributions between the parties, the court held that the circumstances were 
enough to constitute extraordinary circumstances which rendered equal sharing 
repugnant to justice. 
I would therefore submit that if the facts were to be changed so that the action 
was not an adulterous relationship but rather abuse within the marriage which 
began at an early stage of the marriage, that this should also be considered to 
have doomed the relationship . If there are also disparate contributions then it 
88 Money v Money [1992] NZFLR 289. 
89 Above n 87 . 
90 Above n 32. 
9 1 Iv I [1995] NZFLR 276. 
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should be sufficient to satisfy section 14. 
There has been a lack of clarity within the case law as to whether the 
circumstances have to be extraordinary in both nature and kind. 
92 I would 
argue that the legislature could not have meant to exclude situations where the 
circumstances themselves were of a common nature, but were of such a degree 
as to make them extraordinary even in their commonness. For example; a 
situation where one partner overspends the family budget on unnecessary 
impulse buying, would seem to be a reasonably common scenario in New 
Zealand society. However, most people would not hesitate to consider it 
"extraordinary", if that partner was to spend money to such a degree as to place 
the family in extreme debt, unable to pay for the ordinary necessities of life .If 
this is correct then could domestic abuse fulfil the requirements of being an 
extraordinary circumstance? 
Statistics 93 show that domestic abuse in New Zealand society is prevalent, and 
therefore cannot be considered to be extraordinary in itself However, it is 
unclear whether certain cases, of an extreme degree, may be able to satisfy the 
requirements. For example, take a situation where the abusive partner has been 
excessively abusive, both physically and emotionally. As a result, his partner is 
permanently disfigured and unable to work. She is psychologically scarred and 
has developed a fear of all men, believing that they all wish to hurt and control 
her. His behaviour is extraordinary in the context of the marriage partnership, 
and the effect that his actions have had on her are extreme. Surely here, the long 
term harm that she has suffered would make it repugnant to justice to divide the 
matrimonial property equally. The law is not clear in this area as to what will 
constitute a reason to depart from equal sharing, the discretion given to the 
92 Martin v Martin ( Above n 85) illustrates this confusion. Woodhouse J clearly states that 
the phrase refers to circumstances U1at must not only be remarkable in degree but also be 
unusual in kind. In comparison Richardson J found Urnt "ilie entire range of possible 
circumstances is open 
for consideration. Circumstances may be ex1raordinary in kind or degree. 
93 A Morris Women 's Saf ety Survey 1996 (Victimisation Survey Committee, Wellington, 
1997). 
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court means that it is possible that given the right situation, domestic abuse 
could be considered to be an extraordinary circumstance. 
However this is not helpful to the large number of women who suffer abuse at 
the hands of their partner, but not to the necessary degree. For those few 
victims who manage to fall into either of these two exceptions, 
94 the effect is 
not to grant them a greater share but simply to change the method of division 
from equal sharing to contribution based division. 
95 
4 Contribution Based Division 
Section 18 of the MP A defines what can be considered to be a contribution 
under the Act. The possible contributions and their equal status reflects the 
purpose of the Act, to recognise the value of all contributions to the marriage 
partnership, rather than just financial contributions to the property of the 
marriage. These contributions encompass the care of children, acquisition and 
creation of matrimonial property, the provision of money and the giving of 
assistance or support to the other spouse. This measure of contributions is used 
to determine the respective entitlements to balance matrimonial property 
96 and 
the matrimonial home and family chattels, if an exception to the equal sharing 
rule is satisfied. 
It is possible that under this form of division an abused spouse may be worse off 
than she would have been had she received half of the matrimonial property. If 
the husband contributed a large majority of the property to the marriage at its 
inception, and he has kept her at home away from the work force, the court is 
likely to view their contributions as uneven and award him a larger share of the 
matrimonial property. 
94 Parties can also depart form equal sharing under the Act by making a section 21 agreement 
to contract out of U1e Act. 
95 As I will discuss in the nexi. section, contribution based division is not necessarily 
beneficial, as ilie victim may have, for various reasons, made a very modest contribution to ilie 
matrimonial property. 
96 Defined in sections 11 and 15 of U1e Matrimonial Property Act 1976. 
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The Matrimonial Property Act does not allow considerations of misconduct of 
the respective partners when deciding how they have contributed to the 
marriage relationship . This is due to the existence of "No Fault" divorce. 
(a) History of no fault divorce 
The right to a divorce used to be based upon the fault of the respondent and the 
innocence of the applicant. No fault divorce has been available since the 1920's 
and has changed the focus from a law based on the view that marriage is a 
contract between the parties to the marriage under no fault, to the concept of a 
marriage partnership in the 1976 Act. If one of the parties to the contract 
breached the terms of that contract, then the innocent party was able to cancel 
the contract and receive compensation. Women received this compensation in 
the form of maintenance. 97 
(b) The current law 
The necessity for fault is removed from the 1976 Act and divorce can now be 
obtained on the grounds of that the marriage has broken down irreconcilably. 
98 
To be granted a dissolution under section 39 the applicant will generally have 
obtained a separation order under section 22. Section 22 requires that there be 
such a state of disharmony between the parties to the marriage of such a nature 
that it is unreasonable to require the parties to continue, or, as the case may be, 
resume cohabitation with each other. 
There is a presumption of equal sharing for balance property 
99 as well as 
domestic property '
00 unless there has been: 
a) Unequal contributions as assessed under s 18, 
b) Separate property sustained or diminished by the other spouse, or 
97 J Behrens " Domestic Violence and Property Adjustment: A Critique of "No Fault" 
Discourse."(1993) 7 AJFL 9. 
98 Refer to s 39 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980. 
99 Balance property is all matrimonial property that is not the matrimonial home or family 
chattels as defined within the Act. 
100 Domestic Property is the matrimonial home and any family chattels as defined in the Act. 
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c) Personal debts that have been satisfied by domestic property. 
101 
With the concept of a no fault divorce, also came the removal of any 
consideration of misconduct, except where it has direct relevance to the 
property. Section 18(3) outlines the very limited circumstances in which 
misconduct can be considered. 
The court may, -
(a) In determining the contributions of a spouse to the marriage partnership; or 
(b) In determining what order it should make under any if the provisions of 
sections 26, 27, 28, and 33 of this act, -
Take into account any misconduct of a spouse that has been gross and palpable 
and has significantly affected the extent or value of the matrimonial property; 
but shall not otherwise take any misconduct of a spouse into account, whether 
to diminish or detract from the positive contribution of that spouse or otherwise 
howsoever. 
In order to be able to consider the misconduct of an abusive partner it is 
therefore necessary to find a way to link the misconduct to the property. 
Victims of domestic abuse will generally not be able to show that they have 
contributed significantly more to the marriage partnership without making 
reference to the abuse of their other partner. 
It is possible that the victim may be able to show that the abuse within the 
relationship had a significant effect on the property that they were able to 
acquire, and the value of that property. If the abuser has refused to let his 
partner work, then he will have deliberately limited the potential income and 
assets of couple. Also if he has been physically violent, then he has probably 
broken furniture and other household items, generally of value to his partner, 
diminishing the extent of her separate property. 
101 Above n 32. 
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There are two way to consider contributions. The subjective approach allows 
the court to consider what each party would have contributed had they been 
able to . Each party is expected to contribute to the best if their ability. If that 
ability is reduced by circumstances such as illness or an inability to get paid 
employment, then that is taken into consideration and does not count against 
them, so long as they have contributed to the best of their ability. 
102 Juliet 
Behrens' 
103 argues that the law should apply the subjective approach as it 
allows for the affect which domestic violence has had upon the victim's ability 
to contribute. The court can look at the affect of the abuse and determine 
whether in the circumstances, the victim has contributed to the best of her 
ability. 
The objective approach looks at the contribution in relation to the benefit that it 
has had for the marriage relationship. It makes no allowance for the individual ' s 
limitations. I would suggest that this can create injustice in a situation of 
domestic abuse, as the actions of the abuser may have affected the extent to 
which the victim can contribute, and he is then rewarded for that. 
(c) Negative contributions 
Juliet Behrens', 104 criticises the effect that no fault divorce had had on the 
consideration of misconduct and specifically the effect that it has had on the 
assistance available for victims of domestic abuse. In relation to contributions, 
she poses the idea that the abusive behaviour of the husband should be 
considered to be a negative contribution. In the Family Law Act, 
105 
contributions are considered to be towards the welfare of the family, rather than 
the marriage partnership as it is in New Zealand, so it is easy to see how abusive 
behaviour has a negative impact upon the family . Behrens suggests that the law 
is being biased in what it chooses to consider. She gives the example of the 
court looking not only at the fact that the woman does the household tasks but 
102 Above n 32. 
103 Above n 97. 
104 Above n 64. 
105 Refer to section 79 of the Family Law Act of Australia . 
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also at the standard to which she does them, if the standard is low then it is 
likely to cause a reduction of her contribution. The court in New Zealand is able 
to take into account negative as well as positive contributions to the marriage 
partnership. The return which each partner receives from the marriage should be 
in proportion to the contribution that they have made. A spouses consumption 
of Matrimonial property and income is relevant for consideration as is the 
negative contribution of bad house keeping or excessive laziness, as m 
comparison the other spouses contribution assumes greater potency. 
106 
In line with this theory, it could also be argued that the court should look at the 
effect that the actions of the abusive partner have on the victim's ability to 
contribute to the marriage partnership, making a woman's contribution in the 
home more difficult, must have economic consequences. It would seem unjust 
to allow the husband to benefit from the detrimental affect that he has had on 
his wife's contribution. The wording of the Act however would seem to 
preclude any considerations of this nature. Section 18(3) clearly states that the 
court "shall not otherwise take any misconduct of a spouse into account, 
whether to diminish or detract from the positive contribution of that spouse." 
Therefore the court cannot consider the effects of misconduct unless it satisfies 
the four elements of section 18(3): 
a) It must be Gross and palpable, 
b) It must affect the extent or value of the property, 
c) The effect must be significant, and 
d) The misconduct must occur before separation. 
107 
Another consideration is whether this section precludes the court from 
considering the misconduct of one spouse, in order to increase the contribution 
of the other spouse. 108 For example the court may wish to look on the wife's 
household tasks in a more favourable light once they are able to understand the 
106 Above n 32, Paragraph 12.47. 
107 Above n 32, Papa 13 .7. 
108 Above n 97. 
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adverse situation in which this contribution was performed. 
109 I would conclude 
however, that the court would possibly look on this as detracting from the 
positive contribution of the abusive spouse. 
I would suggest that the move from fault to no fault divorce has seen the 
development of too rigorous an exclusion of considerations of misconduct. As 
the law stands, victims of domestic violence are going to have difficulty in 
establishing that they are entitled to a greater share of the matrimonial property, 
(presuming that the matrimonial home and family chattels is exempt from equal 
sharing) unless they can establish that the abuse has affected the extent and 
value of the property. Division on the basis of contribution may also serve to 
give them a lower entitlement than they would have received under equal 
sharing. 
The 1963 Act allowed more flexibility to consider the impact of misconduct and 
enable the court to find that misconduct amounted to a failure to measure up to 
ordinary responsibilities and detracted for their contribution. Case law under the 
1963 Act showed that misconduct needed flexibility to be dealt with thoroughly. 
This is lacking in the 197 6 Act. 
110 
5 Problems 
There are several problems inherent in allowing domestic abuse to be 
considered when dividing property. Firstly there is a very real concern that if 
the court was to allow domestic abuse to be considered, it would open the flood 
gates to other concepts of fault, taking the law back to a contract analysis of 
marriage. There is also the concern that false allegations would be made in an 
effort to obtain a larger share of the matrimonial property. 
109 In Williams v Williams [1980] 1 NZLR 532. The court looked at the husbands contribution 
in the light of his wife 's alcoholism and awarded him a larger share of the property on the 
basis U1at his contribution received increased recognition for the situation in which it was 
performed. 
11 0 Above n 32, para. 13 .8. 
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The court seems to be reluctant to become involved in the private sphere of 
family life, 
111 and where the misconduct has had no impact upon the property in 
question, the court claims that it is not its role to be dictating what is 
appropriate matrimonial conduct, and should not stray into passing moral 
judgment. 112 
6 Conclusions and Recommendations 
Applications under the MP A do not allow for any consideration of domestic 
abuse. What options there are available under the Act for obtaining anything 
other than an equal division, substitute equal division for division based upon 
contribution, which I have shown is not likely to benefit victims of domestic 
abuse in gaining a greater share of the property. 
In its present form the legislation fails to provide for the long term needs of 
victims. They are not able to rely upon the domestic abuse to obtain the larger 
share of property that they need to be independent of their abusive partner. One 
possible solution to this problem can be found in the Family Law Act in 
Australia. Australian matrimonial property law divides property on the basis of 
two considerations, contributions to the welfare of the family, and needs arising 
from the marriage. I have already discussed the issues relating to contribution, 
however, it is possible that domestic abuse could be taken into account under a 
needs based division. 
The effects of domestic violence on women are insidious and long-term. They 
include dire physical injuries, or can be less easily identifiable physical and 
psychological injuries, including damage to self-esteem and independence. 
These effects have inevitable economic consequences. 
113 
111 L Bradford "The Countcrrevolution: A Critique of Recent Proposals to reform no-fault 
Divorce Laws." (1997) 49 SLR 607. 
1 1 2 Above n 111. 
113 Above n 97, 17. 
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Property division based on the needs arising out of the marriage, overcomes 
some of the problems of admitting concepts of fault. It is the existence of the 
need, not the cause for that need, that is at issue here. In this system a victim of 
abuse will not be compensated for the actions of her partner, but will instead 
have her needs met through being granted a sufficient share of the available 
resources to satisfy them. 114 
There must be a balancing act between the needs of the victim and her abusive 
partner, but it does allow for some recognition of the victims needs which have 
arisen from the abusive nature of the marriage. 
It must be acknowledged that a needs based division must also apply to the 
needs of the abusive partner. This means that in some situations the balance of 
needs will not benefit the victim. This echoes the DV A which requires the court 
to take into consideration the accommodation needs of all the parties when 
granting a property order. This is necessary to preserve overall justice. There 
are potential problems with the application of this system, including how the 
court determines what is a legitimate need and which needs should take 
precedence over others. For the purpose of this paper I am simply highlighting 
that the theory of needs based division is potentially more effective at meeting 
the long term needs of victims of domestic abuse than the present law in New 
Zealand. 
The effectiveness of this measure will be dependant upon the judiciary and 
counsel for victims of abuse being aware of what needs victims have, and the 
fact that they have arisen from the abuse, such as a lessened capacity to work, 
physical injuries which may prevent work, or emotional harm which causes the 
victim to relate badly to men in the work place. 
Once again this remedy would only be available if the applicant was able to 
show that she had a genuine need for a larger share of the property, This is just, 
11 4 Above n 64. 
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as the victim will always be able to show a need for safe and adequate 
accommodation, and a need for financial independence from her partner. If she 
does not have these needs, then it is right that she not be granted any additional 
assistance. 
B Mediation 
Mediation has sprung up in recent years as a popular form of alternative dispute 
resolution. In family law cases, the non-confrontational, relaxed atmosphere of 
mediation has been found to be highly conducive to reaching binding 
agreements where the parties own the agreement, and therefore are happier with 
the result and more likely to abide by it. 
Couples are frequently turning to the mediation and counselling service 
provided by the Family Court to attempt to solve their property and custody 
disputes before they resort to litigation, however, while Mediation has many 
good features it is not always going to be a suitable option. In this paper I will 
not attempt to deal with even the main issues surrounding Mediation, I will 
simply look at the issues which arise when partners to an abusive relationship 
come to mediation. 
1 Is mediation a suitable alternative? 
When a couple come to mediation to resolve a dispute, the presence of 
domestic abuse in the relationship is problematic for two reasons: 
1) There is a risk that the abuse will continue at the session; and 
2) The effect that the violence has had on the relationship and the way that the 
parties relate to each other will affect the outcome of the mediation. 
115 
Mediation aims to promote mutuality and equality in negotiation through 
11 5 C StaniforU1 The Evolution of the Family Law Reform Bill 1994: some unresolved 
issues." (1995) 2 CanLR 145. 
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assistance of a neutral third party. It has a structured process which emphasises 
the parties' own responsibilities for decision making. Its application is therefore 
limited to dealing with relationships where both parties are capable of being 
empowered by the process. 116 
When you combine the aims of mediation with an understanding of the nature of 
domestic abuse, an issues as to it's suitability becomes evident. 
Violence against women does not consist of instances of conflict between 
perpetrator and the target about which the parties can negotiate, or which can 
be mediated with the assistance of a skilled third party. It is behaviour by the 
perpetrator which is designed to control the target of the violence. 
117 
Women in abusive relationships have been disempowered, this means that they 
negotiate for what they think that they can get, rather then an outcome which is 
just or equitable, or which protects their safety.
118 Because women in abusive 
relationships are disempowered and the relationship is about control, it creates a 
strong imbalance of power, which makes mediation inappropriate. 
The power imbalance causes problems in a number of ways; 
(a) Impossibility of consensuality. 
Mediation depends upon the presence of some capacity for consensuality, a 
desire to settle the dispute, and some capacity for compromise. Instead of this 
the abuser will inevitably bring the pattern of control which has characterised 
the relationship to the mediation. 
119 
116 S Gribben "Violence and Family Mediation: Practice." (1994) 8 AJFL 22, 23. 
117 H Astor "Violence and Family Mediation: Policy. " (1994) 8 AJFL 3, 4. 
11 8 Above n 117, 5. 
119 Above n 117. 
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(b) Unjust burden on the victim 
Mediation will generally require that the victim be in the same room as her 
abuser, which will cause her fear, and affect her ability to negotiate on her own 
behalf 120 
(c) Exploitative agreements. 
Victims of abuse become hypersensitive to the signs and signals of their abuser 
in an effort to prevent abuse. These signals are generally undetectable to the 
mediator, and result in the abusive partner controlling what his partner agrees 
to, controlling and intimidating her throughout the mediation. 
(d) Ineffective outcomes. 
The abuser will either succeed in controlling his partner during the mediation, or 
he will ignore as irrelevant any decision reached during the session. Women 
will often concede property rights in exchange for custody of the children, and 
the developed behaviour of concession and acceptance will preclude her from 
effectively reaching an adequate agreement. 
121 
(e) Neutral mediators. 
The concept of the neutral mediators is also flawed in the face of abuse. A 
neutral mediator is required to treat all parties equally, but in a situation of 
power imbalance, this equality of treatment does not create equality between the 
parties. 
Therefore while mediation is good for couples who are able to value each others 
needs, and reach a compromise, the nature of domestic abuse and the affect that 
it has on the way that the parties relate to each other, means that Mediation will 
generally not be suitable where the relationship has involved domestic abuse. 
120 Above n 117. 
121 Above n 117. 
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Section 31 of the DV A acknowledges that programme sessions that involve 
both the offender and the victim. Section 31 states that a protected person and a 
respondent . .. cannot be required to attend programme sessions at which the 
other person is also present. 
As outlined earlier a ' programme' as defined in section 2 means a programme 
that has the primary objective of protecting the victim from domestic violence, 
assisting a child to deal with the affects of domestic violence or stopping or 
preventing violence on the part of the respondent. 
Examples of these kinds of programmes would include anger management, 
victim support, men for non-violence, and women's learning groups. However 
section 31 envisages that they victim and her abuser may be present at the same 
session which would indicate that counselling is also included within the scope 
of the definition. 
Whether this definition can extend to cover mediation is unclear. Orders for 
mediation are not available under the DV A and their nature as a dispute 
resolution tool would appear to indicate that they are precluded from the 
definition. They are not designed to protect the victim or prevent violence. 
The DV A does not expressly state that the victim and her abuser cannot be 
compelled to attend mediation, however, by acknowledging joint sessions are 
not advisable in the presence of violence, it sets a standard which the court 
should not ignore. 
VII RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recent changes introduced in the Domestic Violence Act 1995 have been a 
large step forward in protecting and assisting victims of domestic abuse. 
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When you break the needs of abused women into immediate, short term and 
long term needs it enables you to see that although the law has made an 
attempt to meet the needs for safe accommodation in the immediate and short 
term future, the provisions relating to providing for their long term needs are 
inadequate. 
The availability of ex parte orders has provided for much of the need. 
However, as I stated earlier, there is a concern that the court will not grant 
orders because of the availability of a refuge or inadequate accommodation. In 
the light of the potentially lengthy waiting periods for a hearing this is not an 
acceptable alternative to an occupation order. This however must be balanced 
with a concern not to unduly discriminate against the respondent. 
Occupation and Tenancy orders are an effective solution if it is remembered 
that they are only a temporary measure. It is my recommendation that the 
remedy that the DVA does provide, would be strengthened, by placing limits 
on the conditions that can be attached to an occupation order. There needs to 
be an acknowledgement that the presence of domestic violence in a 
relationship, changes the dynamics of the relationship. Careful consideration 
needs to be made as to the implications of any conditions upon the parties, 
especially the applicant and any children. 
It also needs to be accepted that although the DV A is the primary statute 
dealing with domestic violence, that role is very limited in terms of property. In 
turn any relief available under the MP A is very limited. 
The options available for receiving long term assistance from the law are 
ineffective and arguments raised in relation to ss 14 and 18 are a mere 
possibility at best. The law is concerned with the protection of victims of 
domestic abuse but appears to have neglected to provide any long term 
solution to the problems created when an intimate relationship is violated by 
abuse. 
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It is my recommendation that the law relating to the division of matrimonial 
property needs to be reconsidered, and the question asked, who is it designed 
to protect. I would argue that they no fault divorce regime has limited 
considerations of misconduct into too strict a boundary, and has succeeded in 
protecting those who abuse the trust and intimacy of the marriage relationship, 
where they should be protecting the victims of such abuse. 
The presence and effect of domestic abuse in a relationship should be 
considered as a relevant factor in determining the division of matrimonial 
property, I believe that the Australian system of considering the needs arising 
out of the marriage is a potential solution. There are problems associated with 
introducing a needs based division into New Zealand matrimonial property law 
as I discussed earlier. I do not recommend that the legislation should be 
changed to include division on this basis, as it would be a radical change to a 
problem which may be remediable by a less drastic solution. 
I recommend that the Matrimonial Property Act should be amended to add 
another element to the list of contributions under section 18 to include a 
consideration of actions by one spouse which create a future need for their 
partner. This would allow the court the flexibility to consider the needs of the 
parties, and to address that need on a permanent basis rather than the 
temporary solution provided by an accommodation or tenancy order. The court 
would not be judging the actions of the abuser and punishing them per se, but 
would be acknowledging the need that they had created. 
This amendment would also require that s 18(3) be amended to allow the court 
to consider misconduct where it is gross, palpable, and has substantially 
affected the future needs of the other party to the marriage. This would ensure 
that the standard is high enough to rule out considerations of adultery and other 
concepts of fault unless it is of such a nature that it creates a substantial future 
need. It also allows the court the flexibility to only grant an unequal division 
where it finds that the case warrants it. 
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The present law has succeeded in creating a hole through which victims of 
domestic abuse fall through. The clean break principle of the Matrimonial 
Property Act 1976 is not being achieved in this situation, the one situation 
where it is vitally important that they victim be able to break cleanly from her 
abusive relationship begin afresh. If the holes in the law are not fixed then the 
law will continue to fail one of the groups in society that most needs the laws 
help and protection. The law must protect victims of domestic abuse not allow 
the control and manipulation of their abuser to be continued through the 
restrictive boundaries of the law. 
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